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The A.B.A. Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct 
A Selective Commentary 
I n August, 1983, the American Bar Association adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
(Model Rules)! to replace the Model 
Code of Professional Responsibility 
(Model CPR? as the standards govern-
ing the ethical practice of law by 
American lawyers. The Model Rules 
were developed by the A.B.A. Com-
mission on Evaluation of Professional 
Standards during six years of analysis 
and public debate in response to criti-
cisms of the standards in the Model CPR. 
The Commission, popularly called 
the "Kutak Commission" after its chair-
man, Robert J. Kutak, was composed of 
both lawyers and non-lawyers. Its Final 
Draft (Proposed Model Rules),3 issued 
on May 31, 1981, was amended during 
three A.B. A. House of Delegate sessions 
and finally was overwhelmingly adopted 
last summer by voice vote at the A.B.A. 's 
Annual Meeting held in Atlanta. State 
high courts and bar associations across 
the country, including the Maryland 
State Bar Association, now are con-
sidering the Model Rules as a replace-
ment for state CPR's. Until adopted by 
the Court of Appeals of Maryland, the 
Model Rules have no binding effect on 
the conduct of lawyers in Maryland. 
This article provides commentary on 
some of the issues that Maryland and 
other states will consider. It compares 
the different formats of the Model 
Rules and the Model CPR and high-
lights some of the advantages of the 
Model Rules' format. In addition, some 
of the issues that generated the most 
controversy during the A.B.A.'s con-
sideration of the Model Rules are exam-
ined in relation to both the Model CPR 
and the Maryland CPR. 
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Format 
The format of the Model Rules is 
similar to the formats of the American 
Law Institute Restatements and the 
Uniform Commercial Code. Each Rule 
states a principle and is followed by an 
official comment. "The Comment ac-
companying each Rule explains and il-
lustrates the meaning and purpose of 
the Rule.... The Comments are in-
tended as guides to interpretation, but 
the text of each Rule is authoritative."4 
Research notes are to accompany each 
Rule and be kept up to date as the Mod-
el Rules are interpreted by courts and 
ethics committees. 
In contrast, the Model CPR has a 
three-tier format with nine Canons stat-
ing "axiomatic norms" under which are 
grouped "aspirational" Ethical Consid-
erations and "mandatory" Disciplinary 
Rules. s Although the drafters of the 
Model CPR intended that disciplinary 
action should be taken against a lawyer 
only for violations of the Disciplinary 
Rules and that the Ethical Considera-
tions should be regarded only as goals 
to be achieved, some courts have utilized 
Ethical Considerations and Canons as 
the foundation for discipline.6 
The more fundamental Ethical Con-
siderations (those stating duties that 
clients and the public expect lawyers al-
ways to fulfill) are mandatory Model 
Rules. The CPR Canons, which often 
inaccurately describe the disciplinary 
standards grouped under them, are en-
tirely eliminated. As a result, the Model 
Rules are clearer, and practitioners are 
less likely to be misled about the mini-
mum standards to which they must 
adhere. 7 
The Model Rules are organized under 
eight functional headings that are more 
descriptive and logically categorized 
than the Canons in the Model CPR. 
This format makes the answers to spe-
cific questions easier to find. A lawyer 
seeking to resolve a problem can locate 
the applicable Model Rule by turning to 
the heading that best describes the con-
text in which the problem arises. Under 
the heading "Client-Lawyer Relation-
ship," Rules 1.1 through 1.16 set out 
the general obligations of all lawyers to 
their clients. Additionally, in the sepa-
rate headings of "Counselor" and 
"Advocate," the Model Rules distin-
guish between the lawyer's duties when 
acting as a counselor and when serving 
as an advocate.8 The obligations of law-
yers in other transactions are grouped 
under other appropriate headings. This 
more rational framework of the Model 
Rules provides clearer and more com-
prehensive guidelines for lawyer con-
duct. Consequently, lawyers can resolve 
ethical dilemmas more quickly and ac-
curately using the Model Rules than 
they can using the Model CPR.9 
Substantive Issues 
The most hotly debated issues in the 
Model Rules concern client confidences 
and the regulation of lawyer advertising 
and solicitation. These Rules are the 
ones whose counterparts in the Model 
CPR vary substantially from state to 
state. Because of these and other local 
variations, consideration of the Model 
Rules in each state should include care-
ful analysis of local interpretations of 
the state's existing CPR in order to de-
termine which of the Model Rules 
should be amended to conform to state 
policy. 
The following issues are discussed in 
this commentary: (1) the extent to 
which communications between law-
yers and clients should remain confi-
dential in cases of client crimes and 
fraud;lO (2) duties of lawyers when re-
presenting organizations, such as corpo-
rations;l1 (3) restrictions on advertising 
and soliciting by lawyers seeking to per-
form professional services for profit 
and the use of tradenames;!2 (4) re-
quirements concerning lawyers' fees, 
such as the use of written fee agree-
ments;!3 and (5) conflicts of interest, 
including certain transactions with 
clients that are singled out in the Model 
Rules for specific limitations.14 
Client Confidences 
Provisions of the Model Rules that 
relate to "client confidences"!5 evoked 
the greatest controversy. Lawyers' reve-
lations of client confidences in order (i) 
to comply with law, (ii) to prevent 
client crimes and frauds, and (iii) to rec-
tify the consequences of a client's mis-
use of the attorney-client relationship 
to perpetrate crimes and frauds are the 
areas where lawyers' duties to their 
clients and to the public directly conflict 
and require a careful balancing of com-
peting interests. 
Compliance With Law The Kutak 
Commission's Proposed Model Rule 
1.6(b)( 5) permitted a lawyer to reveal 
client confidences to the extent believed 
necessary "to comply with the Rules of 
Professional Conduct or other law." 
Although Model CPR DR 4-101(C)(2) 
says essentially the same thing, the 
A.B.A. House of Delegates nevertheless 
deleted clause (b)(5) from Rule 1.6. 
This deletion creates needless confu-
sion in resolving conflicts between du-
ties imposed by other Rules. 
Model Rule 1.2(d) says, "[a] lawyer 
shall not counsel a client to engage, or 
assist a client, in conduct that the law-
yer knows is criminal or fraudulent .... " 
Rule 8.4 provides that "professional 
misconduct" for which lawyers will be 
disciplined includes criminal conduct 
adversely reflecting "on the lawyer's 
honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a 
lawyer in other respects";!6 conduct 
that involves "dishonesty, fraud, deceit 
or misrepresentation";!7 or conduct 
"that is prejudicial to the administra-
tion of justice. "!8 How can a lawyer in 
whom a client has confided information 
that is criminally or fraudulently in-
criminating honor that client's confi-
dence as required by Rule 1.6 without 
When read together, 
Model Rules 1.6 and 
3.3 require a lawyer 
to reveal past client 
perjury where the 
lawyer has 
represented the client 
in court, but not 
where the client is 
about to consummate 
a criminal fraud 
through the use of 
the lawyer's work 
product. 
violating Rules 1.2(d) or 8.4? The only 
sensible construction of these compet-
ing Rules is to require the lawyer to 
reveal client confidences if necessary in 
order to comply with Rules 1.2(d) or 
8.4, even if such compliance violates 
Rule 1.6. Cautiously worded support 
for this construction is found in the 
Comment to Rule 1.6, which states: 
The lawyer must comply with the 
final orders of a court ... requiring 
the lawyer to give information 
about the client, [but first the law-
yer must invoke the attorney-
client evidentiary privilege] .... 
The Rules of Professional Con-
duct in various circumstances per-
mit or require a lawyer to disclose 
information relating to the repres-
entation. See Rules 2.2, 2.3, 3.3 
and 4.1. In addition to these pro-
visions, a lawyer may be obligated 
or permitted by other provisions 
of law to give information about a 
client. Whether another provi-
sion of law supersedes Rule 1.6 is 
a matter or interpretation beyond 
the scope of these Rules, but a 
presumption should exist against 
such a supersession. 
Rule 1.6 would provide clearer guidance 
if it simply specified that disclosure of a 
client confidence does not violate Rule 
1.6 if the lawyer is required by another 
Rule, other law or a court order to 
disclose client confidences. 
Prospective Client Crimes and Frauds 
In DR 4-101(C)(3), the Model CPR 
permits a lawyer to disclose "the inten-
tion of his client to commit a crime and 
the information necessary to prevent 
the crime." The Kutak Commission's 
Proposed Model Rule 1.6(b)( 1) limited 
permissible disclosures to those neces-
sary to prevent the client from commit-
ting "a criminal or fraudulent act ... likely 
to result in death or substantial bodily 
harm, or substantial injury to the financial 
interests or property of another [emphasis 
added]." The A.B.A. House of Delegates 
limited permissible disclosures further 
by deleting the italicized language and 
amending the Rule so that disclosure is 
permitted only to the extent the lawyer, 
"reasonably" believes is necessary to 
prevent "imminent death or substantial 
bodily harm."!9 Some people have cri-
ticized this additional limitation, claim-
ing that it subverts the public interest by 
requiring lawyers to allow their clients to 
perpetrate serious crimes and frauds 
which lawyers should be given the dis-
cretion to prevent. 
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Crime or Fraud Using Lawyers' 
Services In Proposed Model Rule 
1.6(b )(3), the Kutak Commission pro-
posed that a lawyer be permitted to dis-
close client confidences to the extent 
believed necessary "to rectify the con-
sequences of a client's criminal or 
fraudulent act in the commission of 
which the lawyer's services had been 
used. "20 The A.B.A. House of Dele-
gates deleted this provision, yet it re-
fused to amend Rule 3.3 (Candor To-
ward the Tribunal), which "requires 
disclosures of information otherwise 
protected by Rule 1.6" if a lawyer 
comes to know that material evidence 
that the lawyer has offered is false, and 
other remedial measures fail. Rule 3.3 
is narrower than DR 7 -102(B)( 1) of the 
Maryland CPR, which requires disclo-
sure of any fraud by the client and not 
merely disclosure where the lawyer has 
offered false evidence. 
When read together, Model Rules 
1.6 and 3.3 require a lawyer to reveal 
past client perjury where the lawyer has 
represented the client in a court, but 
not where the client is about to consum-
mate a criminal fraud through the use 
of the lawyer's work product, in which 
case the lawyer is required only to with-
draw from providing legal services and 
to keep silent. The Comment to Rule 
1.6 explains, however, that 
[n]either this Rule [1.6] nor Rule 
1.8(b) [prohibitng use of client 
confidences to client's disadvan-
tage] nor Rule 1.16( d) [protec-
tion of a client's interest after 
withdrawal] prevents the lawyer 
from giving notice of the fact of 
withdrawal, and the lawyer may 
also withdraw or disaffirm any 
opinion, document, affirmation, or 
the like [emphasis added].21 
One may question whether withdrawal 
or disaffirmance of the lawyer's work 
product would sufficiently protect the 
lawyer against charges of criminal or 
civil fraud in all cases. Moreover, Model 
Rules 1.2(d) and 8.4 may require the 
lawyer to disclose client confidences, 
depending on the circumstances. Clearer 
guidance would be afforded if the Kutak 
proposal had been retained.22 
The A.B.A. House of Delegates' 
amendment to Proposed Model Rule 
1.6 was said to be necessary to further 
the policy that encourages clients to re-
veal all of the relevant facts in order 
to obtain effective representation. This 
policy requires that information the 
client gives the lawyer to assist in the 
IO-The Law Forum/Spring, I984 
representation must be kept in strictest 
confidence. 
Basing the change on this worthy pol-
icy seems misplaced. When the client 
lies or misrepresents the transaction to 
the lawyer in order to advance the 
client's own criminal or fraudulent pur-
pose, the false information interferes 
with the lawyer's lawful representation 
of the client. By lying or misrepresent-
ing the facts, the client intends to gain 
the lawyer's unwitting assistance to 
further the client's illegal or fraudulent 
pursuits in a way that would be unavail-
able if the client had been truthful with 
his lawyer in the first place. The client 
knows that the lawyer may not know-
ingly help to commit a fraud or crime. 







whose employees act 
illegally and against 
the organization's 
interests. 
If the client nevertheless retains the 
right to prohibit the lawyer from dis-
closing the facts even after the lawyer 
learns that the relationship has been 
abused, then the client is encouraged to 
lie initially to his lawyer until the crime or 
fraud has been consumated, comfortable 
in the knowledge that the lawyer's 
lips are sealed. This arrangement actual-
ly subverts the policy of encouraging a 
full and frank disclosure by clients of all 
of the relevant facts and instead encour-
ages clients to misuse lawyers' services. 
Perjury by Criminal Defendants 
Differences among the states' judicial 
determinations and the lack of defini-
tive statements by the Supreme Court 
create special problems in the case of 
the perjurious client on trial for a 
crime. Although Rule 3.3 is workable 
in the context of civil litigation, it fur-
nishes inadequate guidance to the law-
yer in a criminal case. 
Disclosures of a criminal defendant 
to his lawyer are likely to be protected 
by the Sixth Amendment and by the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments as 
well.23 The Comment to Rule 3.3 re-
cognizes the possibility that these con-
stitutional rights may prevail over the 
lawyer's duty to disclose described in 
the Rule. But neither the Rule nor the 
Comment provides ethical guidance for 
a criminal defense counsel in cases of 
sudden perjury or where the accused 
insists on testifying falsely. Clearer 
guidance might be provided by specifi-
cally incorporating in either Rule 3.3 or 
the accompanying Comment the sub-
stance of the A.B. A. Criminal Justice 
Standards. Rule 3.3 might then read as 
follows: 
(e) Notwithstanding subsections 
(a) through (d), a lawyer for a de-
fendant in a criminal case shall not 
disclose that the client has perpetrat-
ed a fraud or testified falsely. How-
ever, if the lawyer knows that the 
client will testify falsely, the lawyer 
shall: 
( 1) counsel the client against 
such testimony; and 
(2) not assist the client in pre-
paring such testimony; and 
(3) not assist the client in tes-
tifying except to the extent 
necessary to avoid revealing to the 
fact finder the lawyer's knowledge 
that the testimony is false; and 
( 4) not refer to such testi-
mony in the lawyer's argument to 
the fact finder unless the circum-
stances of the case require such a 
reference in order to avoid revealing 
to the fact finder the lawyer's 
knowledge that the testimony is 
false. 24 
Representing An Organization 
Model Rules 1.13(a), (d) and (e) de-
fine the lawyer's relationships with or-
ganizations (such as corporations) that 
the lawyer may represent and the law-
yer's relationships with its officers and 
other constituents more clearly than EC 
5-18 in the Model CPR. 
Model Rules 1.13(b) and (c) detail 
the steps that must be taken by a lawyer 
who represents an organization when an 
officer or employee acts illegally and 
where his action might be imputed to 
the organization and cause it substantial 
injury. If the organization's "highest au-
thority" refuses to act to rectify the 
problem, then the lawyer "may resign 
in accordance with Rule 1.16." Ac-
cording to the Comment to Model Rule 
1.6, the lawyer may disclose the organ i-
zation's confidences only in accordance 
with Rule 1.6. 
Proposed Model Rule 1.13( c) would 
have permitted a lawyer to disclose cer-
tain confidences of an organization 
client notwithstanding the limitations 
of Rule 1.6, when the lawyer reasonably 
believed that the organization's highest 
authority acted contrary to the organiza-
tion's interests and that disclosure was 
in the organization's best interests. 
Some critics of this proposal claimed 
that it would result in lawyer whistle-
blowing, which would grossly interfere 
with accepted standards of corporate 
governance. Amendments adopted in 
February, 1983 to cure these alleged 
(~roblems rendered Rules l.13(a) and 
(d) essentially impossible to apply.25 
These imperfections were corrected at 
the August, 1983 House session. Rule 
1.13 now provides necessary guidance 
for practitioners when representing 
corporations and other organizations 
whose employees act illegally and 
against the organization's interests. 
Controversy may continue nevertheless 
over whether the Kutak Commission's 
proposal permitting disclosure notwith-
standing Rule 1.6 should be substituted 
for the House's more limited version. 
Advertising And Soliciting 
Model Rules 7.1 through 7.3, governing 
advertising and solicitation, have 
essentially the same literal effect as 
DR 2-101, DR 2-103 and DR 2-104 of 
the Maryland CPR. False or misleading 
advertising and solicitation of profes-
sional employment for pecuniary bene-
fit are prohibited. The term "solicit" 
includes not only in-person contact, 
but also written communications di-
rected to specific recipients to recruit 
them as clients in particular matters. 
Thus, general mailings are permitted, 
but targeted mailings are not. Such a 
prohibition could impair a lawyer's 
First Amendment rights. 
In MSBA Ethics Opinion 81-21 
(February 16, 1981), the Maryland 
State Bar Association Ethics Commit-
tee enunciated guidelines that have had 
the effect of permitting not only general 
mailings but also letters and advertise-
ments seeking employment in specific 
legal matters as well. 26 This Opinion an-
ticipated the Supreme Court's analysis 
of lawyer advertising articulated in In re 
RM.].27 decided in 1982, a year later. 
The lawyer in RM.]. had mailed an-
nouncements of the opening of his new 
office to persons outside the group con-
sisting of "lawyers, clients, former 
('I accept the four thousand years in Limbo with the understanding 
that it in no way constitutes an admission of wrongdoing." 
Drawing by Lorenz; © 1983 The New Yorker Magazine, Inc. 
clients, personal friends, and relatives," 
to whom such announcements may be 
sent under DR 2-102(A)(2). The Court 
noted that the state policy of preventing 
false or misleading advertising might 
just as well be achieved by requiring 
lawyers to file copies of all mailings 
with the state's disciplinary committee. 
The Court pointed to the Kutak Com-
mission's less stringent requirement set 
forth in Proposed Model Rule 7 .2(b), 
which required lawyers to retain writ-
ten communications for one year.32 
Since the record failed to disclose why 
less restrictive limitations would not 
suffice to achieve the governmental 
purpose of preventing false or mislead-
ing advertising, the state's absolute pro-
hibition under DR 2-102(A) was held 
to be an invalid restraint upon the law-
yer's First Amendment rights. Discipli-
nary charges against the lawyer were 
therefore dismissed. 
Although the Comment to Rule 7.3 
rationalizes that "direct mail solicita-
tion cannot be effectively regulated by 
means less drastic than outright prohi-
bition," it states no reason why direct 
mail solicitation without subsequent 
personal contact cannot be as effective-
ly regulated as general mailings, as the 
Supreme Court suggested in RM.]. Ac-
cordingly, before adopting an absolute 
prohibition against all direct mail solici-
tation, the states should determine if a 
lesser restraint will not suffice to effec-
tuate the underlying policy. States 
should be prepared to justify the more 
stringent regulation if it is to be applied. 
Specialty Designations Model Rule 
7.4, which prohibits a lawyer from stat-
ing or implying that he is a specialist, is 
more restrictive than DR 2-105 of the 
Maryland CPR, which has the effect of 
permitting a lawyer to advertise as a 
specialist, so long as the lawyer can 
prove that the claim is truthful. 
Tradenames Model Rule 7.5 ex-
pressly permits lawyers to practice un-
der tradenames, so long as the trade-
names are not false or misleading. A 
trade name also must not imply connec-
tion with a governmental agency or a 
public or charitable legal services or-
ganization, presumably because use of 
such a name would be misleading per se. 
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Disciplinary Rule 2-102(A) of the 
Maryland CPR prohibits practicing un-
der a tradename, but permits the con-
tinued use in firm names of the name of 
any deceased or retired member of the 
firm or a predecessor firm in a contin-
uing line of succession. The Court of 
Appeals of Maryland upheld the consti-
tutionality of the tradename proscrip-
tion in In re Corporate Name-Oldtowne,29 
in which an admitted purpose for using 
a tradename rather than the firm name 
at a new location was to prevent regular 
clients of the firm from knowing about 
the connection between the practices at 
the two locations. In this case, the 
Maryland court adopted the reasoning 
of the Supreme Court in Friedman v. 
Rogers,30 which upheld a Texas statute 
prohibiting optometrists from practic-
ing under tradenames. 
In deciding whether to abandon the 
absolute prohibition of tradenames in 
DR 2-102(A), states should consider 
amending the Comment to Model Rule 
7.S or promulgating guidelines to speci-
fy additional types of tradenames that 
are misleading per se. 31 States should 
also consider imposing a requirement 
that the name of at least one lawyer ad-
mitted to practice in the state be clearly 
identifiable as the lawyer responsible to 
clients for the legal services rendered 
under the tradename. 
Lawyers' Fees 
One improvement made by Model 
Rule 1.5 is the requirement that law-
yers' fees be "reasonable" rather than 
not "clearly excessive" as provided in 
DR 2-106(A) of the Model CPR. The 
factors to be considered under Rule 1.5 
in determining the reasonableness of a 
fee are the same as those set out in DR 
2-106(B). 
Much of the A.B.A. House of Dele-
gates debate over fee provisions cen-
tered on whether fee agreements must 
be in writing, as the Kutak Commission 
proposed. Fee disputes are, of course, a 
major source of complaints by clients 
to bar associations and disciplinary 
agencies. Rule 1.S(b) as adopted pro-
vides that where a lawyer has not regu-
larly represented the client, the lawyer 
must communicate the basis or rate of 
the fee to the client, "preferably in 
writing. " 
The House of Delegates added to 
Proposed Model Rule 1.5 the DR 2-
106(C) prohibition against contingent 
fees in criminal cases, as well as a prohi-
bition against contingent fees in certain 
domestic relations matters, a restriction 
that was not specified in the Model 
CPR. The wisdom of these prohibitions 
continues to be a subject of debate. 
Both Model Rule 1.S( e) and Model 
CPR EC 2-22 permit the division of 
fees among lawyers. However, the 
Model Rule requires a written agree-
ment with the client where the division 
is based on joint lawyer responsibility, 
rather than on the specific services ren-
dered by each lawyer. In all cases, the 
total fee must be reasonable. 
Conflicts of Interest 
Model Rule 1.7, which sets out the 
general conflict of interest rules, is 
clearer and simpler than its Model CPR 
counterparts. For example, Rule 1. 7(b) 
specifies that, even if the client con-
sents, a lawyer shall not represent the 
client where the representation may be 
materially limited by the lawyer's own 
interests, unless the lawyer reasonably 
believes that the representation will not 
be adversely affected. Compare DR S-
101(A). Rule 1.7(b), unlike its CPR 
counterparts, also applied where the 
conflict arises after the lawyer has been 
engaged, as well as where the conflict 
exists before representation commences. 
Compare DR S-lOS. 
The factors to be 
considered under 
Rule 1.5 in 
determining the 
reasonableness of a 
fee are the same as 
those set out in 
DR 2 .. 106(B). 
Model Rule 1.9 improves upon the 
Model CPR because it establishes a law-
yer's duties to former clients in terms 
that go beyond simply maintaining 
client confidences. Compare EC 4-6; 
EC 4-S. 
Model Rule 1.8 provides specific 
prohibitions and limitations in certain 
kinds of transactions which, by their 
very nature, involve conflicts of inter-
est. Under Rule 1.8(c) lawyers are 
prohibited from preparing an instru-
ment for a client giving the lawyer or a 
member of the lawyer's immediate fam-
ily a substantial gift, unless the client is 
related to the donee. Compare EC 5-5. 
Disciplinary Rule 5-l03(B) of the 
Model CPR prohibits lawyers from ad-
vancing or guaranteeing financial assis-
tance to clients other than advancing 
court costs and expenses of investiga-
tion or medical examinations, and then 
only if the client remains ultimately lia-
ble for these expenses. This prohibition 
has proven impractical where indigents 
are involved and where, in class action 
representation, side agreements for pay-
ment of fees or expenses are prohibited. 
Some lawyers have resorted to the sub-
terfuge of making written agreements 
that clients will reimburse expenses re-
gardless of outcome, without ever in-
tending to enforce the agreements. Rule 
l.8(e) sensibly permits lawyers to ad-
vance court costs and expenses of litiga-
tion, the repayment of which "may be 
contingent on the outcome," and al-
lows lawyers to advance these expenses 
for indigent clients without expecta-
tions of reimbursement. 
Model Rule l.8( a) sets out meaning-
ful requirements for lawyers entering 
into business relationships with their 
clients. These requirements are clearer 
than those set out in DR 5-l04(A). The 
Model Rules require that the terms of 
such relationships must be fair and rea-
sonable to the client and fully disclosed 
in writing. The client must have a rea-
sonable opportunity to consult inde-
pendent counsel and must consent in 
writing to the arrangement. It is ques-
tionable, however, whether these strin-
gent requirements should also be made 
applicable to cases where a lawyer simply 
acquires a pecuniary interest that 
may be adverse to a client's interests, 
especially when the lawyer's representa-
tion of the client is unrelated to the pe-
cuniary interest being acquired. 
Conclusion 
The Model Rules were developed large-
ly as a response to recent concerns ex-
pressed by lawyers and the public about 
how to deal with some of the more dif-
ficult issues in the field of professional 
responsibility. The Model Rules adopt-
ed by the A.B.A. provide clearer guide-
lines than the Model CPR and are more 
helpful in resolving the ethical problems 
that confront many lawyers. Nevertheless, 
before adopting the Model Rules, the 
states should consider making appropri-
ate changes to reflect important vari-
ations in disciplinary policies that have 
gained local acceptance. m 
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[hereinafter cited as MODEL CPR]. 
6 See Note, Lawyer Disciplinary Standards: 
Broad v. Narrow Proscriptions, 65 IOWA L. 
REV. 1386 (1980). 
7 Ambiguities in the MODEL CPR that are 
eliminated in the MODEL RULES include: (i) 
adding Rule 1.4 (Communication) (which 
requires a lawyer to keep the client reason-
ably informed about the status of a matter) in 
place of EC 9-2; (ii) including Rule 1.8(c) (a 
prohibition against preparing an instrument 
for a non-relative client that gives the lawyer 
a substantial gift) in place of EC 5-5; and (iii) 
eliminating the nebulous concept of "ap-
pearance of impropriety" (Canon 9), which 
has sometimes been used unfairly to 
discipline lawyers. 
8 Compare e.g., MODEL RULES 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 
and MODEL RULES 3.1 through 3.9. 
9 See Moser, The Model Rules: Is One Format 
Better Than Another? 67 A.B.A.]. 1624 (Dec. 
1981) (supporting the Model Rules); Kettle-
well, Keep the Format of the Code of 
Professional Responsibility, 67 A.B.A.]. 
1628 (Dec. 1981); and Brief in Support of 
Retention of CPR Format, National Organi-
zation of Bar Counsel (November 23, 1981). 
10 See MODEL RULES 1.6 (Confidentiality of 
Information), 3.3 (Candor Toward the 
Tribunal) and 4.1 (Truthfulness in State-
ments to Others). Rule 1.13 (Organization as 
Client) "does not limit or expand the 
lawyer's responsiblity" to maintain client 
confidences. MODEL RULES 1.13 Comment 
(Relation to Other Rules). Cj. PROPOSED 
MODEL RULES. See also MODEL RULES 1.2(d/. 
Related provisions of the MODEL CPR 
appear under Canon 4 (A Lawyer Should 
Preserve the Confidences and Secrets of a 
Client), Canon 7 (A Lawyer Should 
Represent a Client Zealously Within the 
Bounds of the Law), and Canon 1 (A Lawyer 
Should Assist in Maintaining the Integrity 
and Competence of the Legal Profession). 
11 See MODEL RULE 1.13 (Organization as 
Client) and MODEL CPR EC 5-18. 
12 See MODEL RULES 7.1 ,through 7.5. The 
MODEL CPR provisions are DR 2-101 
(Publicity), DR 2-102 (Professional Notices, 
Letterheads and Offices), DR 2-103 (Recom-
mendation of Professional Employment), 
DR 2-104 (Suggestion of Need of Legal 
Services), and DR 2-105 (Limitation of 
Practice). DR 2-101, DR 2-102, DR 2-
104(A)(2) and DR 2-105 of the Maryland 
CPR differ substantially from the related 
DR's in the MODEL CPR. 
13 See MODEL RULE 1.5 (Fees). The MODEL CPR 
provisions are principally DR 2-106, DR 2-
107 and the related EC's. 
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their dependencies and often celebrate
their release at the closest bar or with a
fix.
A Program For Young People
and First-Time Offenders of
Non-Violent Crimes
What kinds of offenders ought to be
imprisoned? I suggest that the way of
enlightened punishment is to incarcerate
only those convicts who have shown
themselves to be a danger to the public
or to themselves and whose acts have
been so reprehensible that the judicial
system must demonstrate in the only
way it can - by imposing a sentence
involving the loss of liberty - that
society will not tolerate such conduct.
Murderers, rapists, arsonists, child
molesters and armed robbers deserve
prison sentences. As for the rest, I
suggest that no judge or magistrate
should sentence an offender to jail





ought to expiate their
sins in better ways
than serving prison
sentences.
First-time, non-violent offenders or
those who commit victimless crimes
ought to expiate their sins in better
ways than serving prison sentences. We
can, as I mentioned earlier, sentence
those who commit non-violent alcohol
and drug-related offenses to neighbor-
hood rehabilitation facilities. We can
compel other non-violent offenders to:
" Make restitution to the victim.
* Complete a reasonable educational
program of public school equiva-
lence, so that they can at least read
and write.
* Undergo psychiatric or other ap-
propriate counseling.
* Receive vocational testing and
counseling.
" Maintain full-time employment and
support their dependents.
" Remain trouble-free for a pro-
longed period of time.
" Perform community service for a
specific length of time.
16-The Law Forum/Spring, 1984
Community Service As an
Alternative to Imprisonment
Community service is an effective
way for offenders to repay their debts
to society. Most responsible probation
officers provide judges with pre-sen-
tence reports that outline the offender's
life and habits. These reports indicate,
among other things, the offender's
hobbies, interests and talents.
An appropriate alternative sentence
might be to assign the offender to work
with retarded or disabled children for
seven to eight hours every weekend for
a year or longer. Performing community
service is one way the offender can
utilize his abilities to do some good for
society.
If the offender is a competent reader,
he can be required to record texts or
read to the blind every Saturday or
Sunday for a few years. If he is handy
with tools, he can be assigned to work
at homes for the aged and infirmed that
sorely need carpenters, brick masons
and handymen. If he is a church-goer or
interested in religion, then perhaps he
could drive disabled congregants to
their Sabbath worship or to meetings or
deliver their meals in the evenings.
There are untold community needs that
can be fulfilled by first-time, non-
violent offenders. It is only a matter of
matching the resources to the needs.
Conclusion
Good sentencing calls for an accurate
perception of both the offender's place
in the criminal spectrum as well as
society's need to protect itself against
violence. There is no easy way to reduce
the cost of crime by means that will be
both punitive and rehabilitative, Jailing
costs more than any other form of
social control. Even if we do need more
jails, jails alone are not enough.
In his address to the American Bar
Association in 1981, Chief Justice
Warren Burger emphasized that "[w]e
must accept the reality that to confine
offenders behind walls without trying
to change them is an expensive folly
with short-term benefits." When you
cut your finger you do not necessarily
have to go to the hospital to be
bandaged. Maybe jails, like hospitals,
should confine only those for whom
there is no reasonable alternative. Z
Model Rules Notes
continued from page 13
1 See MODFl RUIES 1.7, 1.8 and 1.9. The
rlIi(d MODEI CPR pioisions aic DR 5-
101(A), DR 5-104, DR 5-105, DR 5-106 and
DR 5-107. See also EC 5-5, EC 5-6, EC 5-7 and
EC 5-8.
15 This term is used in this commentary to mean
"information relating to representation of a
client." See MODEL RULE 1.6(a), a broader
concept than that used in the MODEL CPR.
Cf. DR 4-101(A).
16 MODEL RULE 8.4(b).
17 MODEL RULE 8.4(c).
18 MODEL RULE 8.4(d).
19 MODEL RULE 1.6(b)(1).
20 Cf. DR 7-102(B)(1) of the MODEL CPR, which
provides:
A lawyer who receives information clearly
establishing that:
(1) His client has, in the course of the
representation, perpetrated a fraud upon
a person or tribunal shall promptly call
upon his client to rectify the same, and if
his client refuses or is unable to do so, he
shall reveal the fraud to the affected
person or tribunal, [except when the
information is protected as a privileged
communication] [brackets added].
The bracketed language, added by an A.B.A.
amendment in 1974, has never been adopted
in Maryland. See Attorney Grievance Com-
mission of Maryland v. Sperling, 296 Md.
558, 463 A.2d 868 (1983). See also Kramer,
Clients' Frauds and Their Lawyers' Obliga-
tions: A Study in Irresponsibility, 67 GEO.
L.J. 991 (1979).
21 Added as a last-minute compromise, this
comment is intended to protect lawyers from
complicity in criminal or civil fraud. See S.
Taylor, Jr., The Law: A Case History, N.Y.
Times, January 9, 1983, §6 (Magazine), at 31
(recounting the involvement of law firms in
the notorious O.P.M. equipment leasing
frauds and the civil suits that followed).
22 See also MODEL RULE 4.1(b). But cf.
PROPOSED MODEL RULES 1.2(d).
23 See e.g., Lowery v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727
(9th Cir. 1978).
24 Cf. 1 A.B.A. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE Proposed Standard 7.7 (2d ed. 1980)
(Testimony by the defendansf, approval of
Which was withheld pending consideration
of the MODEL RULES by the A.B.A. House of
Delegates. Former Standard 7.7 has been
implicitly followed in at least one case,
Thornton v. U.S., 357 A.2d 429 (D.C.C.A.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1024 (1976). For
an analysis of this problem, see Comment,
Proposed Client Perjury: A Criminal Defense
Attorney's Alternatives, 12 U. BALT. L. REV.
248 (1983).
25 See 3 BUSINESS LAW MEMO (A.B.A. Section of
Corporations, Banking and Business Law,
No. 4, March/April 1983) at 1.
26 Opinion 81-21 and the guidelines followed
the approach of an earlier Kutak Commission
Model Rules draft that allowed targeted mail
solicitations. See also MSBA Ethics Opinions
84-37 (October 17, 1983), 83-36 (April 20,
1983), and 82-49 (April 22, 1982) generally to
the same effect.
27 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
26 The Kutak Commission's Proposed Model
Rule 7.2(b) was adopted by the A.B.A. House
of Delegates with one modification: written
communications must be retained for two
years, not one year as proposed.
29 285 Md. 132, 138, n.4, 400 A.2d 1111, 1115n.4
(1979).
30 440 U.S. 1 (1979).
31 This approach was adopted by the Penn-
sylvania Disciplinary Board following the
decision in In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982).
The guidelines are available through that
agency or the Attorney Grievance Commis-
sion of Maryland.
